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THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO




A large portion of antitrust law, on an international scale, is devoted
to the regulation of mergers and takeovers. The regulation of mergers and
acquisitions has proven difficult due to the competing benefits and burdens
of mergers. Companies choose to merge for a variety of reasons, including
the desire to obtain greater market power, economies of scale, tax
advantages, and diversification. Gaining a stock exchange listing is another
important reason to merge. These advantages of merging do not necessari-
ly convert into consumer benefits unless the acquiring company decides to
lower prices.'
Depending on the particular facts involved, a merger can benefit or
harm the economy. A merger strengthens the economy if it allows a
company to expand and diversify, increase its efficiency, or lower its costs.
These may result from technological and capital cost efficiencies, or
distribution, production, and advertising economies. However, a merger
can be damaging if it results in less competition, monopolization,
avoidance of prohibitions against restrictive agreements, a dysfunctional
allocation of resources, or damage to the employees of the targeted
company or to the community.
2
In response to these varied outcomes of mergers, the legislatures and
courts of numerous developed nations have long attempted to draw the line
between economically beneficial and harmful combinations. This article
will focus on the Australian approach to merger and takeover law. In
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particular, it will concentrate on section 50 of the Australian Trade
Practices Act of 1974, which is the core of that nation's merger control.
This article will review the background of section 50, its substantive
provisions, and recent problems surrounding its application. Finally, it will
offer suggestions for resolving these section 50 problems.
II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 50
Australia initially attempted to overcome the problems of restrictive
trade practices through the Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906.
This legislation outlawed combinations that purposely restrained trade
which harmed the public. This statute was followed by the Trade Practices
Act of 1965 and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1971. None of
these early trade statutes dealt specifically with mergers or takeovers.3 In
1962, the Barwick Bill contained a proposal that would have subjected a
merger to examination if it served as a substitute for a condemned
restrictive agreement. However, this idea failed to become law because of
the complexities of enforcement.4 Since no existing statute gave specific
consideration to mergers, companies tended to merge to avoid restrictive
trade practice challenges. To prevent this occurrence, the Commissioner
of Trade Practices sought a new law to cover mergers.-
The Trade Practices Act of 1974 was the first statute to govern
mergers. As enacted, subsection 50(1) of this Act declared that:
A corporation shall not acquire, directly or indirectly, any shares
in the capital, or any assets, of a body corporate where the
acquisition is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening
competition in a market for goods or services.6
This subsection applied a similar test to acquisitions because it focused on
whether the acquisition was likely to have the effect of substantially
decreasing competition. This Act empowered the Trade Practices
Commission to authorize an acquisition if it provided a benefit to the
public. The Trade Practices Commission could also clear an acquisition
3. Id. at 323.
4. G.Q. TAPERELL ET AL., TRADE PRArICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTON 362 (2d ed.
1978).
5. Frances Hanks, Not with a Whimper but a Bang: Bare Transfer of Monopoly and
the Trade Practices Act, 14 AUSTL BUs. L. REv. 150 (1986).
6. Walker, supra note 1, at 324.
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by declaring that it did not violate section 50." Since mergers can be
either beneficial or harmful to a competitive market based on the particular
facts involved, the drafters designed section 50 to contain this type of
flexibility.8
The Trade Practices Act of 1974 was used as a tool by targeted
corporations to prevent takeovers. A corporation subject to a takeover
attempt would generally try to obtain an injunction through section 80 of
the Act on the grounds that the takeover would substantially lessen
competition. Consequently, in frequent instances, this action would require
the acquiring corporation to gain authorization of the merger from the trade
practices commission. Such authorizations were difficult to obtain.9
m. SUBSTANCE OF SECTION 50 AS AMENDED
A. Rationale Behind Amendments
The original version of section 50, as contained in the 1974 Act, was
criticized for various reasons.'0 As a result, the Swanson Committee was
designed to review the Act.'" This Committee concluded that the original
text of section 50 was too extensive because it applied to insubstantial
acquisitions that were unlikely to have a harmful effect on competition.
The Swanson Committee suggested that mergers should not be covered by
the Trade Practices Act of 1974 if the target company did not have an
average annual turnover of at least $3 million. However, Parliament
rejected the Swanson Committee's recommendations as inadequate because
it failed to consider the discrepancies in turnover that generally occur in
different industries.
However, the Australian government ultimately decided to improve the
original section 50 by repealing it in its entirety and enacting a new
provision.'2  The revision to section 50, as well as other significant
adjustments in the original 1974 Act, occurred through the passage of the
Trade Practices Amendment Act of 1977. Section 50 was one of the most
hotly debated provisions in this Act. The revised section 50 prohibits a
corporation from acquiring the shares or assets of another corporation in
7. Id. at 324.
8. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 363.
9. EditoriaI 14 AUSTL. Bus. L. REv. 145, 146 (1986).
10. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 363.
11. Hanks, supra note 5, at 150.
12. Id. at 151.
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two situations. First, an acquisition cannot occur if the acquiring
corporation "would be, or be likely to be, in a position to dominate a
market for goods or services." 3 Second, an acquisition is prohibited
when the acquiring corporation is in a position to dominate the market, the
target or a corporation related to the target is or is likely to be a competi-
tor, and the acquisition would or would be likely to substantially strengthen
the power of the acquiring corporation to dominate that market. 4
B. Dominance Test
In order to fully understand this new section, it is important to define
and interpret several provisions. The 1977 version of section 50 required
interpretation of a control standard as well as a dominance test. Originally,
Australian tribunals analyzed a number of factors to determine whether the
threshold of market control had been met." However, in the Trade
Practices Revision Act of 1986, section 50 was amended by striking the
reference to control. The rationale behind this change was to avoid the
confusion caused by having control and dominance constitute two
inconsistent standards. Now, dominance is the only standard that is
necessary to interpret.
1 6
The term "dominance," as interpreted by the Trade Practices Commis-
sion and the Trade Practices Tribunal, differs from "control" because it
includes market shares that fall short of market control. A corporation that
is the most powerful in the market is considered to be dominant.'7 For
example, in Application of Associated Products and Distribution Pty. Ltd,
a producer with fifty percent of the market was considered dominant even
though another producer controlled thirty percent of that market.'8 In
contrast, this level of superiority is not high enough to be considered
"market control."' 9
Some courts have looked 'at various factors to decide whether the
merger in question creates a corporation possessing market dominance. In
Trade Practices Commission v. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations)
13. Trade Practices Act 1974, § 50(1)(a) (AustI.).
14. Id. § 50(1)(b).
15. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 373-76.
16. AustI. Trade Prac. Rep. (CCH AustI. Limited) 8-000, at 5212 (1989).
17. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 380-81.
18. Decisions of the Trade Practices Commission, Reg. Nos. A331, A15527, File Nos.
A75/552, A75/3115 (1975).
19. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 381.
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Pty. Ltd, the issue was whether Ansett Operations' acquisition of shares
in Avis established a situation of dominance in the car rental market.20
In deciding that market domination was not present, Justice Northrop
looked at five factors:
(1) the firms operating in the market and the degree of market
concentration;
(2) the capacity of Avis to determine prices for its services
independently;
(3) the height of entry barriers;
(4) the extent to which industry products are characterized by
extreme product differentiation and sales promotion; and
(5) the nature of corporate relationships and the extent of
corporate integration.
2'
The court also examined whether this acquisition could create a situation
of market dominance in the future. Section 50 prohibits mergers in which
the acquin corporation "would likely be" in a position of market
dominance.' In finding that this possibility did not exist, Justice
Northrop stressed that this likelihood must be confined to the "reasonable
future."23
C. Interpretation of "Likely"
Courts next determine what type of acquisition would "likely" put the
acquiring company in a position of market control or dominance. The
Australian Tribunal has stated that "likely" refers to "probabilities" that
will be decided on a case-by-case basis rather than through a precise
mathematical statement.2
D. Definition of the Market
The relevant market must be defined in order to determine whether the
merger creates market domination. Subsection 3(a) of section 50 specifies
that "a reference to a market for goods or services shall be construed as a
20. Trade Practices Comm'n v. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty., 20 A.L.R.
31 (1978) (Austl.).
21. Id. at 50.
22. Trade Practices Act 1974, § 50(l)(a) (Austi.).
23. GUIDEBOOK TO AUSTRALiAN TRADE PRAcTIcES LAw, (CCH Austl. Limited) 907-
908.
24. TAPERELL Fr" AL., supra note 4, at 373-76.
1992] 185
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
reference to a substantial market for goods or services in Australia in a
State or in a Territory."' The legislature intended that this definition
prevent mergers in very small markets from being prohibited under section
50. Although the statute is unclear in determining whether a market is
"substantial," this has not become a significant issue because the Trade
Practices Commission has interpreted the term conservatively.' Howev-
er, other questions remain concerning how to define the relevant market in
terms of the type of products it includes and its geographic scope.'
Courts have looked to section 4E of the Trade Practices Act of 1974
to clarify the market definition given in section 50(3)(a). Section 4E
specifies that the definition of a market should include elements that are
substitutable for or competitive with goods or services.' In Re Queensla-
nd Co-operative Milling Association Ltd., the Tribunal stated that this issue
should focus on which products or services have a high cross elasticity of
demand or supply.29
E. Authorization Procedures
To fully understand section 50, familiarity with authorization
procedures is essential. Prior to 1977, clearance procedures would have
also been included in this discussion. However, the 1977 amendments
completely eliminated clearances and changed the authorization procedure
by adjusting its public benefit basis.' ° Currently, under section 88(9) of
the Trade Practices Act of 1974, the Trade Practices Commission may
accept an application by a corporation to acquire shares or assets in another
corporation. An application must be filed within fourteen days after
making arrangements for an acquisition. Unless more time is needed to
obtain additional information, the Trade Practices Commission must make
its decision on the application within forty-five days of its receipt. The
Trade Practices Commission also has the option of granting an authoriza-
tion for a limited period or subject to other limitations.3 However, the
25. Trade Practices Act 1974, § 50(3)(a) (Austl.).
26. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 1 8-480, at 5431 (1989).
27. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 364.
28. Trade Practices Act 1974 § 4E (Austl.).
29. Re Queensland Milling Associations-Proposed Merger, 8 A.L.R 481, 517 (1976)
(Austl.).
30. TAP"ERELL ET AL, supra note 4, at 388.
31. R.B. VERMEEsCH & K.E. LiNDGREN, Busmmss LAW OF AusTRAuA 868 (5th ed.
1987) [hereinafter VERMEESCH & LINDOREN].
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Trade Practices Commission can only grant an authorization if it is
confident that the proposed acquisition would result, or would likely result,
in a benefit to the public.32
A case relevant to the examination of authorization procedures,
although decided prior to the 1977 amendments, is Re Queensland
Cooperative Milling Association v. Defiance Holdings Ltd.3 This case
involved competition between Queensland and Defiance to acquire Barnes
Milling, a smaller company. The Tribunal, in deciding whether an
acquisition would create a benefit to the public, invented a "balance-sheet
approach." The Tribunal listed all the various benefits and detriments to
the public in order to make its decision. The most important detriment was
generally considered to be the alleged anti-competitive effect of the
acquisition.3'
The case of Re Howard Smith Industries Pty. Limited v. Adelaide
Steamship Industries Pty. Limited provides a good example of how this
authorization process works, notwithstanding that it was decided prior to
the 1977 amendments. 35 Here, the Trade Practices Tribunal agreed with
the Trade Practices Commission's decision and did not authorize an
agreement between Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty. Ltd. and Howard
Smith Industries Pty. Ltd. This agreement would have allowed the
formation of a jointly owned corporation to engage in commercial towing
operations previously conducted by Adelaide in the ports of Sydney-Botany
Bay and Newcastle and by Howard Smith in the port of Gladstone. The
Tribunal analyzed various factors including the nature of the industry,
companies involved, the relevant service market and geographical market,
and the commercial likelihood that various results would ensue if the
authorization were granted or refused.3' The Tribunal found that if it did
not grant the authorization, the only likely result would be that Howard
Smith would take back two of its tug boats that were on a short-term
charter to Adelaide. Since Adelaide had substitutes for these boats, the
Tribunal rejected the authorization application and held that the agreement
32. GUIDEBOOK To AUSTRALiAN TRADE PRAcTIcEs LAW, supra note 23, atl 1017.
33. Re Queensland Milling Associations-Proposed Merger, 8 A.L.R. 481 (1976)
(Austl.).
34. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, IN 8-690 through 8-700, at 5553-54.
35. Re Howard Smith Industries Pty. & Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty., 15 A.L.R.
645 (1977) (Austl.).
36. Au.AN A. RANSOM & WARREN PENOILLEY, REsTRICIvE TRADE PRACTICES:
JuDGMENTS, MA'mrAl AND PoLicY 995-1013 (1985).
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would not create a substantial benefit to the public.37 The Tribunal
viewed the "public" as
not simply. .. consumers .... Nevertheless, if such a merger
benefited only a small number of shareholders of the applicant
corporations through higher profits and dividends, this might be
given less weight by the Tribunal, because the benefits are not
being spread widely among members of the community general-
ly.
39
Although the clearance procedure was technically eliminated in 1977,
an informal clearance procedure still exists. People who seek to make an
acquisition consult the Trade Practices Commission to see if the acquisition
would violate section 50. The Trade Practices Commission will state its
opinion on the matter. Although this procedure is informal and non-
binding, its practical effect is to remove the risk of a section 50 proceeding
against the parties seeking the acquisition in question.39
F. Section 50 Remedies
Section 50 provides a variety of remedies. One such remedy is to
impose a fine, which may not exceed $250,000 for a corporation or
$50,000 for an individual. These fines apply to attempts which aid, abet,
and induce violations of section 50. In addition, individuals can recover
damages for injuries caused by section 50 violations.'
To prevent infringements of section 50, courts have used injunc-
tions.4" However, as a result of the 1977 amendments, this remedy is
only available to the Attorney General and the Trade Practices Commis-
sion, not private plaintiffs. This limits the chances that a section 50 cause
of action will be brought by any party other than the Trade Practices
Commission. Private parties can only enforce a section 50 action through
divestiture, which is difficult to implement.42
37. IdM at 1012-13.
38. Re Howard Smith Industries Pty. & Adelaide Steamship Industries Pty., 15 A.L.R.
645, 660 (1977) (AustI.).
39. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 18-630, at 5524.
40. TAPERELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 389.
41. Id at 389-90.
42. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-600, at 5511.
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According to section 8 1(1) of the Trade Practices Act of 1974, the
court may dispose of any or all of the shares or assets that have been
acquired contrary to section 50. The Attorney General, the Trade Practices
Commission, or any other person must file the requisite application within
three years after the acquisition in question.43 Although divestiture has
never actually been used as a remedy, a conditional order was issued in the
Australian Meat Holdings case."
G. Failing Company Defense
The failing company defense is yet another component in understand-
ing section 50. The basic premise of this defense is that an acquisition will
not be covered by merger provisions if the target company is undergoing
extreme financial problems and the acquiring company is the only available
purchaser. A similar provision was used in the United States to exclude
coverage under section 7 of the Clayton Act.45
An example of the Australian approach to this defense is demonstrated
in Application of Associated Products and Distribution Pty. Ltd." In this
case, the most prominent potato chip producer wanted to acquire the third
strongest producer. The acquiring company used the failing company
defense to justify the acquisition, stating that the target company's market
share was rapidly declining and the business would fail if the acquisition
was not completed. The Trade Practices Commission refused to allow the
acquisition because it would have increased the difficulty for market entry,
disallowed the target company's re-entry, and prevented competition for the
target company's market share. 47  However, the defense has proven
successful in situations in which only part of the target company's assets
were being acquired and the acquisition would increase the cash flow of
the target company.4s
H. Overseas Acquisitions and Extraterritorial Application
Section 50A was enacted as a result of the Trade Practices Revision
Act 1986. Section 50A deals with acquisitions outside of Australia. This
43. VERMEFSCH & LINDoREN, supra note 31, at 869.
44. AustI. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 18-605, at 5513.
45. TAPERELL r AL., supra note 4, at 377.
46. Decisions of the Trade Practices Commission, Reg. Nos. A331, A15527, File Nos.
A75/552, A75/3115 (1975).
47. TAPERELL sr AL., supra note 4, at 378.
48. Decisions of the Trade Practices Commission, Reg. Nos. C3083, A15548, File Nos.
C75/3684, A75/3252 (1975).
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new provision was necessary because section 50 did not apply to overseas
mergers of foreign corporations that had Australian subsidiaries.
Currently, section 50A may be invoked if a person outside of
Australia, as the result of an acquisition, gains a controlling interest in a
corporation formed within Australia. An action under section 50A may be
brought by the Attorney General, the Trade Practices Commission, or any
other individual who makes an application to the Trade Practices Tribunal
within twelve months after the acquisition in question. Only the applicant
and the corporation, in which an interest has been acquired, are required
to appear before the Tribunal. However, the acquiring entity or another
interested party may intervene with permission. The Tribunal has the
authority to prevent the target corporation from conducting business in
Australia. Moreover, a corporation that disobeys the Tribunal's order may
be subject to penalties, an injunction, damages, or divestiture.49
In addition to section 50A, it should be noted that standing alone,
section 50 may have an extraterritorial application. Section 50 may apply
when:
(1) A trading or financial corporation formed in Australia
acquires anywhere the shares or assets of another corporation that
trades in Australia;
(2) A foreign corporation acquires in Australia the shares or
assets of a corporation that trades in Australia; or
(3) A foreign corporation that carries on business in Australia
acquires the shares or assets of a corporation.50
I. Exceptions
Section 51 contains the exceptions to section 50. The most important
exceptions are: (1) any action authorized by an Act or ordinance; (2) an
understanding involving the working conditions of employees; (3) a
contract provision designed to protect the purchaser in respect to the
goodwill of the business; (4) a contract provision relating to exporting
goods or supplying services outside of Australia; or (5) an action giving
effect to a patent, registered design, or copyright.5'
49. See also Austi. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-905, at 5623-54.
50. Id 8-906, at 5624.
51. Trade Practices Act 1974, § 51 (Austl.).
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J. Relationship with Other Sections and Legislation
The final factor of section 50 that must be addressed is the section's
relationship with other sections of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 and its
relationship with other relevant legislation. Sections 45 and 46 of the
Trade Practices Act of 1974 significantly interact with section 50 of the
Act.52 Section 45 deals with restraint of trade agreements including joint
ventures. Moreover, section 45(7) subordinates implementation of section
45 in favor of section 50.53  Section 46 relates to monopolization.
Paragraph (6) of section 46 attempts to avoid any potential conflict
between sections 46 and 50 by stating that, when a corporation has gained
a section 50 authorization to acquire shares or assets of a target corpora-
tion, the acquiring corporation cannot be deemed to have violated section
46's prohibition against the misuse of market power as a result of that
acquisition.54
Several other legislative acts interrelate closely to section 50. These
acts include legislation regulating specific industries, the Companies
(Acquisition of Shares) Act of 1980, and the Foreign Acquisitions and
Takeovers Act of 1975, which regulates foreign acquisitions that conflict
with Australia's national interest.55
IV. RECENT ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
This section of the article discusses the current issues surrounding
section 50. In particular, this part of the article will analyze recent cases,
as well as several recommendations that a governmental committee made
concerning changes to strengthen section 50. Following this discussion,
the article will suggest how to resolve these issues in order to strengthen
section 50.
A. Authorization Process
Two recent debates have arisen regarding the authorization process.
The first deals with the element of informal clearance. Australia under-
went a period of intense merger activity between 1985 and 1987. At this
52. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-575, at 5483, 8-580, at 5483-84.
53. Trade Practices Act 1974, § 45(7) (Austl.).
54. See also id § 46(6).
55. AustI. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, IN 8-035, 8-045, 8-050, at 5222-24.
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time, the informal clearance procedure was used for many large acquisi-
tions.5 '
As the result of this debate, as well as other questions raised between
1985 and 1987, the Acting Attorney General instructed the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
to examine the merger provisions of the Trade Practices Act of 1974. In
May 1989, this Committee completed its report and made suggestions
regarding the effectiveness of sections 46 and 50, as well as recommenda-
tions concerning the function of the Trade Practices Committee. The
suggestions of this Committee, named the "Griffiths Committee" after its
Chairman Alan Griffiths, are relevant in this discussion and throughout this
section of the article.57
The Attorney General suggested to the Griffiths Committee that
several problems existed with the informal clearance procedure. According
to the Attorney General, this procedure could create uncertainty concerning
the Trade Practices Commission's enforcement policy, deter businesses
from using authorization procedures, and cause a shortage of publicly
available authority about the interpretation of section 50.'g
The Griffiths Committee disagreed with the Attorney General.
Recommendation 7 of the Griffiths Committee report states that "The
Committee recommends that the Trade Practices Act 1974 be amended so
as to provide legislative recognition of the informal consultative process
currently utilised by the Trade Practices Commission in relation to
mergers."59
The Griffiths Committee's position is flawed. The authorization
procedure, as currently designed, is adequate to serve companies desiring
to acquire assets or shares in another company. To receive an authoriza-
tion, the acquiring corporation must notify the Commission within fourteen
days after arranging for an acquisition and the Commission must reply
within forty-five days of the receipt of such application. Surely, this is a
sufficiently brief period of time for the acquiring corporation to receive
word on the status of its application.
Even in the rare instance that the authorization procedure causes
serious inconvenience to the acquiring corporation, this drawback is
outweighed by the risk created by an informal procedure. A merger can
generate a harmful effect on the vibrancy of the market. The magnitude
56. Id 8-631, at 5524.
57. Id 8-000, at 5212.




of this adverse impact necessitates that merger decisions be accorded the
level of protection, public awareness, and full consideration of evidence
that can only be provided through a formal proceeding.
In fact, the Trade Practices Commission has proposed to increase the
level of review by implementing "pre-merger notification procedures,"
which are based on United States law. These procedures would require
companies to provide details on the proposed acquisition, as well as
information on ownership, cross holdings, assets, sales, descriptions of
products, markets, competitors, and sales projections. Although some
argue that this system is overly burdensome, this concern is outweighed by
the Trade Practice Commission's need for information that is required to
make well-reasoned decisions.6°
Another issue concerns conditional authorizations.61 Previously, the
Trade Practices Commission had been reluctant to grant these types of
authorizations because it could not enforce the conditions. The Griffiths
Committee recognized this problem and, in its Recommendation 9,
proposed that "the Trade Practices Act 1974 be amended so as to provide
remedies in respect to breaches of undertakings entered into . . . in
connection with the merger authorisation process .... 62 This recom-
mendation is sound. The ability of the Trade Practices Commission to
ensure execution of its conditions for authorization is crucial to strengthen-
ing its control over harmful mergers.
B. Injunctions
Another controversial element of section 50 is its use of an injunction
as a remedy. Under the 1977 amendments to the Trade Practices Act of
1974, section 81(1A) limited the right to seek an injunction to the Attorney
General and the Trade Practices Commission rather than private plain-
tiffs. 63 The Griffiths Committee has proposed in Recommendation 5 that:
"Mhe private right to injunctive relief in relation to mergers be reintro-
duced to the Trade Practices Act 1974, but that takeover targets and
associated persons should be excluded from this right."'
60. Narelle Hooper, Australia: Business Aims a Kick at Watchdog, Bus. REV. WKLY.,
Mar. 27, 1992, at 34.
61. See, e.g., supra pp. 187-88.
62. Austi. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-730, at 5564.
63. See generally supra pp. 188-89.
64. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-600, at 5512.
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The Law Council of Australia also agrees with this position. The
Council believes that private injunctive relief would significantly boost
enforcement of merger prohibitions. The availability of injunctions to
private parties may result in additional court decisions preventing
economically harmful mergers. This is especially significant given the
Trade Practices Commission's limited means. The Council also addressed
the concern that injunctions could be abused by delaying acquisitions that
could have a potential public benefit. The Council believed this situation
would not arise if the defendant could seek damages for unsuccessful
claims and if the Tribunal refused to hear claims without a legal basis.65
Furthermore, the Council claimed that the injunctive remedy is already
available to private litigants through indirect approaches."6 An example
of this approach occurred in Brisbane Gas Co. Ltd v. Hartogen Energy
Ltd. & Anor.67 In this case, Brisbane Gas, a shareholder in the Oil
Company of Australia N.L., claimed that Hartogen Energy and Street
Nominees' acquisition of shares in the Oil Company violated section 50.
As part of the relief requested, Brisbane Gas asked for an injunction
pending the disposal of the shares and pending the hearing. Justice
Fitzgerald allowed the injunctive relief, stating that the prohibition on
private parties obtaining injunctions did not extend "to restrain a person
who has contravened... section 50 from engaging in conduct based upon
the position this illegitimately acquired."' In response to this case, the
Council believed that it was better for a private party to obtain an
injunction directly rather than through this type of indirect means.6
The position of the Griffiths Committee and the Law Council of
Australia that private parties, as well as governmental entities, should be
able to obtain injunctions for section 50 violations is reasonable. This
additional method of enforcement can only strengthen the implementation
of section 50. A private party may be aware of an acquisition that is
economically harmful and will be eager to stop this acquisition if it
contravenes its own financial interest. With the availability of private
injunctive relief, a private party may be able to prevent a harmful
acquisition that could have slipped past the Trade Practices Commission.
65. i
66. Id
67. Brisbane Gas Co. v. Hartogen Energy Ltd. & Anor., 40-304 Austl. Trade Prac.
Rep. 43,756 (CCH AustI. Limited 1982).
68. Id at 43,758.
69. Austrl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-600, at 5512.
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Also, the Law Council justifiably disagreed with the Brisbane Gas
case. Essentially, if a private party can enjoin the acquiring corporation
from disposing of the assets, as occurred in Brisbane Gas, this party can
prevent the acquisition from becoming effective. In addition, although
there is a risk that long delays and excessive costs will result from an
abuse of a private injunctive remedy, it is the court's function to analyze
the legitimacy of each claim to ensure that such abuses do not occur.
However, the portion of the Griffiths Committee report which asserts
that target companies should not be allowed standing to seek injunctive
relief, is faulty. In some instances, target companies may have a legitimate
section 50 claim that extends beyond their own interest in self-preservation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently dealt
with the same issue in Consolidated Goldfields Plc. v. Minorco S.A. 7° In
this case, the court rejected the general rule that target companies lack
standing to challenge a takeover.7'
Circuit Judge Jon 0. Newman disagreed with the general rule, that a
target company cannot claim antitrust injury in the event of a takeover
because that target company will become a part of the entity that it is
claiming will gain an unfair competitive advantage. Judge Newman
believed that anticompetitiveness would result if the target company lost
its authority to decide independently its price and output. It is the court's
responsibility to decide the legitimacy of the target company's request for
an injunction. These types of claims should not be barred automatically
through legislation.
Another issue concerning injunctions arises in relation to the
previously discussed topic of informal clearances.' As part of its seventh
recommendation, the Griffiths Committee proposed that:
should the Government adopt the Committee's recommendation
on-reintroduction of the private right to injunctive relief in merger
cases, the Trade Practices Commission be empowered, as part of
the legislatively recognised merger consultative process, to grant
immunity from the merger enforcement action, including action
73by private litigants ....
70. Consolidated Goldfields Plc. v. Minorco S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
71. Id.
72. See supra pp. 192-93.
73. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-631, at 5531.
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This recommendation by the Griffiths Committee is flawed. The
judicial system is well qualified to decide the legal issue of whether an
injunction should be granted. It is inappropriate for the Trade Practices
Commission to make a determination based on an informal proceeding
when a court is better equipped to hear all of the evidence and to analyze
the legal merits of a claim.
C. Australia Meat Holdings Case
In 1988, a significant section 50 case was decided. Trade Practices
Commission v. Australia Meat Holdings Py. Ltd involved an acquisition
by Australia Meat Holdings ("AMH") of the entire issued capital of
Thomas Borthwick and Sons (Australasia) Ltd. ("Borthwick").74 Both
companies were in the business of slaughtering cattle and processing them
for export. The Trade Practices Commission sought a mandatory
interlocutory injunction against AMH to prevent the acquisition on the
grounds that it violated section 50.
One reason that the Australia Meat Holdings case is significant is that
it was the first case to analyze the new "dominance" test.7" The Trade
Practices Commission contended that:
(1) AMH, by its acquisition of the Borthwick shares, would be,
or would be likely to be, in a position to dominate the fat cattle
market in northern Queensland or the separate fat cattle market in
each of northern and central Queensland; or
(2) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially
strengthen the existing power of AMH to dominate that market or
those markets.7
In order to determine whether the acquisition caused AMH to become
dominant in the market, the court initially had to determine the scope of
both the product and geographic markets. The court defined the product
market as the "fat cattle market," which included cattle purchased for feed
lots but excluded store cattle purchased for long-term pasture fattening."
74. Trade Practices Comn'n v. Australia Meat Holdings, Austl. Trade Prac. Rep. supra
note 16, 40-876, at 49,465.
75. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 1 8-315, at 5353.
76. Trade Practices Cornm'n v. Australia Meat Holdings, Austi. Trade Prac. Rep., supra
note 16, 1 40-876, at 49,466.
77. See Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 1 8-315, at 49,483.
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In defining the geographic market, the court examined purchaser conduct,
vendors' attitudes, price correlations, and the potential of the geographic
market. The court then concluded that the relative geographic market was
northern Queensland.
In deciding whether AMH dominated this product and geographic
market, the court referred to the five factors set forth in Trade Practices
Commission v. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd.78
However, the court did not consider this list to be definitive. The court
stated that there would be instances when some of these criteria would
prove useless and other instances where additional factors should be
considered. After applying the Ansett factors, the court concluded that
AMH was in a position of dominance which violated section 50. The
court believed that a crucial point to be examined was the nature of the
parties' conduct toward each other in the market. 9 In particular, it was
swayed by the target company's impact on the market prior to the
acquisition. The target company, although small, had a great influence on
prices. Although AMH was not dominant prior to its acquisition of
Borthwick, Borthwick had enough impact on the market that AMH's
acquisition of it would render AMH dominant.,°
The next issue considered by the court was the possibility of
divestiture under section 81(1) of the Trade Practices Act of 1974. As
previously mentioned, Australia Meat Holdings is the first case that
authorized a conditional order for divestiture.' However, this case also
served to narrow the interpretation of section 81(1) in merger situations.82
The court stated that:
Where the contravention of s. 50 takes the form of an acquisition
of shares, the only order which may be made under s. 81 (1) is for
the disposal by the acquirer of those shares. The reference to
"assets" in s. 81(1) is not a reference to assets indirectly acquired
through the acquisition of the company owning those assets, but
to a direct acquisition of the assets of a body corporate. 3
78. Trade Practices Comm'n v. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty., 20 A.L.R.
31 (1978) (Aust.).
79. Phillip H. Clarke, Restrictive Trade Practices, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF AUsTRALIAN
LAW 1988, 342-43 (Robert Baxt & Gretchen Kewley eds., 1989).
80. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 18-315, at 5354.
81. See supra p.189.
82. See Clarke, supra note 79, at 345.
83. Id. at 345 (quoting Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 40-876, at 49,517).
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According to this interpretation, the acquiring corporation could avoid
divestiture of a large amount of assets by transferring the assets of a target
company to another person prior to the divestiture order. This method
would allow the acquiring company to maintain effective control of those
assets despite divestiture."
An alternative to divestiture is relief under Section 81(IA) of the
Trade Practices Act of 1974, which authorizes a court to declare an
acquisition void. The Australia Meat Holdings court decided not to award
this discretionary remedy for two reasons. First, this remedy would be
unfair because Borthwick was not an initial party to the case. Therefore,
it would be financially difficult for Borthwick to repay AMH because
Borthwick had already spent the proceeds of the sale. Second, voiding the
transaction would be especially difficult because the acquisition occurred
in the United Kingdom, which was unlikely to enforce the Australian
decree. 5 Although relief under Section 81(IA) was not awarded,
Australia Meat Holdings is significant because it was the first case in
which an application for relief under this provision was made.'
Ultimately, the court held that AMH should use its best efforts to sell
the Borthwick shares to an appropriate purchaser within two months.
However, AMH also had the option of divesting itself of enough shares
that it could no longer be considered to be in a position of market
domination. 7 Both parties appealed on different grounds to the Full
Court of the Federal Court."8 The full court affirmed the lower court's
decision, except for upholding the Trade Practice Commission's appeal to
include feedlot cattle within the product market defimition."
From the Australia Meat Holdings case, several new issues emerge
regarding the future application of section 50. First, Australia Meat
Holdings was the first case in which an application was filed to void the
acquisition under section 81(1A) of the Trade Practices Act of 1974.90
Although this application was not successful, this case established a
precedent for future applications to be filed. Section 81(1A) has great
potential as a means of enforcing section 50 because it supplies the
84. Id.
85. Id at 345.
86. See Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 18-605, at 5521.
87. Clarke, supra note 79, at 347.
88. Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 8-315, at 5355.
89. Id.
90. Id. 1 8-605, at 5521.
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stringent sanction of voiding the acquisition. Hopefully, this mechanism
will be used in the future order to strengthen section 50.
Second, this case was also the first time that a conditional order had
been issued for divestiture. This order allowed the court to enhance its
flexibility in ensuring that AMH would not be allowed to maintain market
domination. Such flexible enforcement measures increase the court's
ability to achieve the desired result without being unfair to either party.
Third, Australia Meat Holdings narrowed the scope of divestiture
orders by only including the assets directly acquired from the target
company. This aspect of the decision creates the possibility, as previously
discussed, of an acquiring corporation gaining market dominance through
indirect acquisitions. 91 This is a significant danger that courts should
continually be aware of and attempt to prevent. As the issue arises and the
potential for abuse exists, the courts should redefine the Australia Meat
Holdings standard to offset this occurrence.
Fourth, one of the most important aspects of Australia Meat Holdings
is that it is the first case to examine the new dominance test.92 In order
to determine the effectiveness of the court's interpretation, it is helpful to
keep several factors in mind:
(1) AMH probably would have gained greater productive
efficiency as a result of the merger.
(2) AMH had little market power in the beef export market.
(3) Because AMH had little market power, the price of beef may
have decreased due to the increased productive efficiency created
by the merger.
(4) The merger may have benefited Australia's export earnings
by allowing AMH to lower its prices and increase its market
share at the expense of overseas exporters.93
Although Australia Meat Holdings did not prove helpful in terms of
enhancing elective efficiency for society or productive efficiency, the case
did stand for the principles of increasing competitive rivalry in the market
as well as stopping exorbitant industrial concentration. Although all of
these factors are considered goals of the Trade Practices Act of 1974, it is
questionable whether this case could have been decided in a manner that
would have advanced all of them. Because of the difficulty in advancing
91. See supra pp. 196-98.
92. Clarke, supra note 79, at 342.
93. Id. at 347.
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such varied goals, issues arise regarding the overall efficacy of section 50
from a policy perspective."4 However, from an enforcement point of
view, Australia Meat Holdings showed the public that section 50 has some
teeth." This case proved that the Trade Practices Commission could use
section 50 to prevent a major acquisition.
The Trade Practices Commission outlined its policies for 1988-89 as
follows:
If the Commission concludes from its inquiries that dominance is
likely, it will normally explain its position to the company which
may then choose not to proceed, to offer voluntary divestiture...
or to seek formal authorisation on public benefit grounds ....
Where dominance is likely to result from the acquisition but the
proposal appears to have redeeming features, such as assisting an
Australian company to compete against international companies,
then the Commission will suggest to the parties that they seek
authorization."
The Trade Practices Commission has recommended returning to the
competition test used in 1974, which prohibited mergers that were likely
to substantially lessen competition.97 The Griffiths Committee has also
considered this position." However, in August 1991, Attorney General
Michael Duffy examined the issue and concluded that the dominance
standard should be retained. In December 1991, a Senate committee
chaired by Senator Barney Cooney conducted an inquiry into mergers,
monopolies, and acquisitions and recommended that the standard be
changed. As a result, the Attorney General may reconsider his earlier
position." However, the dominance standard is adequate to ensure
effective competition, as shown by the Australia Meat Holdings decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The standards for Australian merger control may be undergoing
tremendous change in the near future. Hopefully, as the Australian
94. See Austl. Trade Prac. Rep., supra note 16, 1 8-785, at 5591.
95. Id.
96. le 8-070, at 5233.
97. Hooper, supra note 60, at 33.
98. Clarke, supra note 79, at 340-41.
99. Hooper, supra note 60, at 33.
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economy grows and mergers become increasingly frequent, Australia will
be able to develop a more effective merger law which encourages vigorous
competition and the stability, ingenuity, and widespread affluence that
flows from it.

